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Kinaesthetic Intersubjectivity: 
A dance informed contribution to self-other relatedness and shared experience in 
non-verbal psychotherapy with an example from Autism 
     Abstract: 
Early interpersonal experiences have been the focus of philosophy and developmental 
psychology for decades. Concepts of self and self-other relatedness seem to have an 
onset in early interaction patterns during dyadic relating. Phenomenologists consider 
the embodied, that is the intercorporeal dialogue as the basis for self-other relating. 
Developmental psychologists have shown that the responsiveness a child is met with 
during early phases of life is a very subtle process. Kinaesthetic intersubjectivity is 
introduced as a perspective on dyadic relating. Embodied attitude during dance duets 
is taken as an example of active nonverbal attunement between interaction partners. 
Shared movement situations will serve as an example of how a sense of 
intersubjectivity and self-other differentiation can be perceived through movement 
structures. Shared movement intervention could offer a new perspective for 
psychotherapeutic intervention in disorders with a disturbed self, like autism and need 
researching.  
     Keywords  
Embodiment, kinaesthetic intersubjectivity, dance, dance movement psychotherapy, 
shared movement, autism 
     Introduction 
Intersubjectivity is bound to our embodied presence and self-other relatedness. 
Concepts taken from dance as a healing art, combined with concepts from 
phenomenology can contribute to a body-informed perspective on intersubjectivity 
*Manuscript without author identifiers
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that reaches into the roots of interpersonal interaction in early development. This goes 
beyond models of cognitive strategies to capture self-other relations such as theory of 
mind (ToM) and simulation theory (ST).  
     Partnering, as seen in improvised dance duets, is taken as a model for mutual 
attunement and engagement in DMP. The duet partners form a non-verbally attuning 
dyad. As the dancers engage in the movement dialogue/encounter with each other, 
they experience a bodily anchored sense of self. In dancing together both dancers feel, 
through direct perception, the kinaesthetic qualities of their movement patterns. 
Regulation of the duet is achieved by each adjusting their impulses to the dynamics of 
the interaction as perceived through non-conceptual kinaesthetic and proprioceptive 
sensations. The dancers come to experience themselves as an intentional subject, 
capable of affecting the shared non-verbal experience. Self-other distinction derives 
from differentiating the movement patterns between the dance partners, by doing so 
personal variations of the previously shared dance and attunement patterns will occur.   
     Clinical experiences from dance movement psychotherapy (DMP) show strong 
similarities with embodied relationships and self-other relatedness as known from 
dance. We argue that the special case of DMP with patients with autism spectrum 
disorders (ASD) can deepen our understanding of how to address the difficulties these 
patients have with non-verbal attunement in dyadic relations, and how to support 
them through embodied psychotherapeutic intervention.   
     Intersubjectivity  
Phenomenologists have used the term intersubjectivity in the course of investigating 
the  nature  of  a  subject’s  experiences  of  being  in  the  world  with  others.  At  the  core  of  
this concept is the engagement of a subject or self in relation to others around him. 
There have been different positions among phenomenologists to describe the 
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properties of this engagement, which could be taken as a two-sided phenomenon 
between the individual and the other.   
     The individual’s orientation towards the world is the perspective Husserl (1952) 
takes when he states that for me to experience myself in congruence with another 
person I would need to shape my own body according to the visual information I have 
about  the  other’s body. Doing so, my bodily experience informs me about the 
experience of the other. This presupposes the ability to match my visual impressions 
to my bodily positioning and the ability to conclude from my own bodily 
experiencing sameness or otherness in regard to the other.  
     Merleau Ponty (1962) shifted the perspective towards the individual being in the 
world when arguing that the experience of sameness between two interacting subjects 
would emerge from a shared intentionality towards a shared object. For a subject the 
experience of sameness with another person would come from sharing same 
intentional gestures towards the same object. In shared (social) actions towards an 
object the subjects would experience intercorporality. This would not only be 
informed by the individual actions, but in the shared space the individual subject 
would be able to know the intentionality of the other through his gestures towards the 
shared object. It is from this special shared space that we develop mutual 
understanding that we are each separate and together at the same time.  
     Elaborating on these views, current phenomenological approaches describe 
intersubjectivity as embodied, socially attuned actions between persons, indicating a 
view on social relating that no longer separates the brain from the body, but considers 
cerebral processes as being processes of tissue and flesh (De Preester, 2008). That is 
to say my body is the means to perceive the other as intentional subject, because it is 
capable of the same actions (ibid 2008).  
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     Intersubjectivity is proposed to be an embodied practice by Gallagher (2005). A 
bodily intentionality is shared by the perceiving subject and the perceived other 
through direct perception (Gallagher, 2008). Here a proprioceptive component is 
matched to the perceptive component through sensitivity to bodily movements, gazes, 
facial  expressions.  In  Gallagher’s  view  intersubjectivity  is  the notion of me being in 
the perception of the other just as the other is in mine (Gallagher, 2005). He links 
phenomenology to neuroscience by referring to the function of a mirror neuron 
system as neuronal bridge between self and other that might be active in this process 
(Gallagher, 2008).  
     Primary intersubjectivity has been proposed to be pragmatic and body-related by 
Gallagher and Hutto (2008). They argue that primary intersubjectivity develops 
through direct perception without any mental representations needed. Later during 
childhood secondary intersubjectivity and theory of mind would develop from this 
basis. The body-related primary interaction leads toward experiences of shared 
intentionality that later in development form the basis for shared representations and 
narrative practices. 
     In the enactive approach that has been presented by De Jaegher and Di Paolo 
(2008) the interaction process is the focus of attention. Sense-making derives from 
responsive sensori-motor engagement with the environment. The shared  ‘in-between’ 
space itself becomes the source of sensations, intentionality and meaning. 
     All these approaches clearly differ from those that focus on mental representations 
of the other during social experiences of a subject; which could be considered a more 
Cartesian/rationalistic approach towards intersubjectivity. 
     In the cognitivist perspective the mind as an information processing system makes 
up inner representations of the other/the world. The embodied connection between 
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subject and other is not taken into account; the cognitive performance is described as 
if solely an activity of the mind. From the perspective of ToM a subject needs to 
know what is going on in the other’s mind in order to know about sameness of 
otherness. In a simulation theory (ST) approach a subject would need to reproduce 
feeling or imagination in order to know about what is going on in the other person’s 
mind or what they are feeling.  
     Both theories presuppose a clearly developed third person understanding of the 
individual. The development of this first – third person differentiation occurs in later 
developmental phases and may be considered an outcome of a maturation of mental 
functioning. We argue that there is another, third way for the self to know about the 
other’s  mind and feeling state, that is, through embodied, kinaesthetic experiences.  
     Early infancy: intersubjectivity through non-verbal exchange 
The  infant’s  relating  to  others  has  been  a  focus  of  developmental psychology since the 
1960s, when developmental psychologists started to describe the early dyadic 
exchanges in terms of behaviour.  Imaging techniques, like film and video were used 
to capture the evolving communication of the neonatal and infant phase (for example 
Kestenberg, 1975; Bullowa, 1979; Beebe & Lachmann, 1988; Trevarthen, 1998). 
Interaction in the early dyad was considered a model of developing self-other 
distinction.  
     During extensive studies of pre-linguistic patterns of infant communication 
Bullowa (1979) found that attention towards a caregiver could be traced by following 
the  child’s  orienting  movement  and  gaze. To grasp the intention of the child a change 
in motion must have taken place in the infant. With a continuous undifferentiated 
state one would feel no signal to connect with the child. She documented this motion-
oriented perspective in series of photographs of mother-infant interactions. 
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     Trevarthen (1998) continued this type of observation. He set a theoretical frame of 
reference for person-to-person interactions in infancy. In his concept of primary 
intersubjectivity he refers to interactions that unfold intersubjectivity through the 
attuned movement patterns between caregiver and child. 
     The term ‘proto conversation’ had been used earlier by Bateson (1979 p. 63/77) to 
describe the early dialogues between mother and child. The cyclic shifts of little 
rhythmic or melodic structures over time during proto conversations were understood 
to be precursors of language. For the interpretation of the early video-studies semantic 
structures were used to explain the early non-verbal attuning processes between 
mother and child.  
     From the primary interrelating the mother-child dyad develops towards secondary 
intersubjectivity (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). In the secondary intersubjective 
exchange the child is able to take the other into account as an intentional being. Co-
operative interplay between child and caregiver, joint attention and other forms of 
person-person object awareness develop in this phase. They are understood to form 
the basis of ToM (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993).   
     Imitation was found to play a prominent role in the non-verbal dialogue in the early dyad. 
Meltzoff and Moore (1998) showed that new-borns are able to imitate facial expressions of 
adult communication partners a few hours after birth. It was proposed that the neonate was 
born with a cerebral representation of the other which enabled him not only to recognise 
species and animate interactive behaviour, but also to match a visually perceived facial 
expression with a motor imitation of that very impression (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003).  
     Neuroscientists hypothesized on precursors of self that are rooted in the bodily 
experience of the baby being simultaneously acting and perceiving. Early imitation might 
arise from a ‘proto-self’ in sensory and motor domains (Panksepp, 1998). Rochat (1998) 
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showed that three month old infants reacted sensitive to self-produced movements of legs 
and suggested an early body inherent organization. This body schema might be present from 
birth, shaped by multimodal experience gained through self-observation while experiencing 
(self) movement. Through the self-observing activity the child is shaping a sense of body as 
object to perception of the self. This self-objectification might be considered a precursor of 
self-reflection (Rochat, 2002) that enables the child to make a self-other distinction. 
     However, during imitation there is an on-going process of mutual influence. Both 
child and adult are oriented towards the other with a strong sensitivity towards 
minimal shifts in the corporeal patterns. The adult is answering the child from their 
empathetic resonance. This double sidedness of the intersubjective exchange is taken 
into account by Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009), when they describe the reciprocal 
involvement  during  intersubjective  experiences  as  mutual  incorporation,  “in  which  
each  lived  body  reaches  out  to  embody  the  other”  (ibid, p. 474). They account for an 
enactive approach to intersubjectivity wherein social understanding is generated 
through intercorporeal participation in shared dynamical whole-body actions. It is 
from interaction in this embodied responsiveness that intentions and meanings can be 
generated. 
     The early dyad: a body-informed perspective 
As we have seen many models on intersubjectivity take a first-second person 
perspective. However, from a developmental point of view, we have to consider that 
the neonate comes from prenatal state with the experience of being at one with the 
organism of the mother. We therefore make the assumption that the primary task in 
the neuro-typical development is not to develop sameness, but to develop otherness. 
Indeed, sameness has been the embodied experience up to birth. The neonate comes 
into the world with shared experiences of diverse quality (Stuart, 2011). Foremost the 
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most elementary rhythms like breath and heartbeat have been shared with mother, as 
have the hormonal swifts, the shifts of activation coming from day-night rhythms, 
mood swings and so on. Perceptions from the surroundings such as sounds, light and 
touch have come to the embryo. We know that unborn babies react to light and 
sounds, and children who have listened to specific music during pregnancy may show 
a preference for that music later on in life. We also know from antenatal care that the 
touch of mother or father, perceived through the skin of the mother, makes the baby 
“shift  into  the  hand”  of  the  touching  person.  Here  clearly  a  kinaesthetic  perception  
plays a role in the organism-to-organism communication (Loman, 2007). These 
proprioceptive experiences might of course feel different from either side of the 
shared boundary, but they form most elementary act (ion) s of relating. After birth the 
shared proprioceptive experiences the child (and the parent) is (are) kinaesthetically 
equipped to regulate the dyadic contact between them. The challenge for the baby 
then is to develop and recognise otherness without losing the sense of connectedness.  
     In this early attunement there is not just one (correct) way of relating or responding 
to the impulses of the child. What is to be a successful matching (and from time to 
time clashing) dyad (and triad) would depend on the specific strengths and needs of 
the interacting partners.  
    In early dyads it is crucial that the child feels well organised by the adult and that 
the adult feels capable of organising the child. This organisation is achieved through 
direct perception through the kinaesthetic senses, with the establishment of weight 
and body containment as the most elementary features at hand (Kestenberg, Marcus, 
Robbins, Berlowe, & Buelte, 1971; Totora, 2010)).  
     These elementary shared embodied experiences can  be  described  as  “kinaesthetic 
intersubjectivity”. Proprioceptive experiences from early non-verbal attunement in the 
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dyad form a template for bodily and social engagement later on in life and will 
continue to underlie all social interactions throughout life. We are very sensitive to 
these processes without always being aware of it. A direct ‘felt sense’ (Gendlin, 
1962/1997) provides us with feelings of matching or clashing with interaction 
partners, whether we want closeness or distance, whether we feel ‘at ease’ or ‘out of 
sync’ - our language covers these processes through expressions like ‘in touch’, ‘in  
tune’  or ‘the chemistry between us was right’, indicating the subtle under-streams in 
non-verbal communication.  
     The character of non-verbal social orientation undergoes significant changes 
throughout life, and the attunement patterns in healthy subjects will fluctuate with, 
and are very sensitive to, the social structure of a situation. It develops from shared 
kinaesthetic qualities towards shared narratives. In narrative practice the experiences 
from kinaesthetic attunement still guide the quality and character of shared narratives 
(Gallagher & Hutto, 2008).  
     A neurobiological perspective on self-other differentiation has been proposed by 
Hurley (2006). Taking simulation theory into account she presented a model on the 
role of shared (neuronal) circuits in the process of differentiation from neonate 
symbiotic state towards self-other differentiation. According to Hurley this would 
require five developmental steps, with the first to be ‘basic adaptive feedback control’  
that  enables  the  interacting  subjects  to  participate  in  each  other’s  actions  without  
mental representations.  
     In psychopathology we find disturbances of the mutual attunement between 
caregiver and child. These can arise from not being matched well or they can originate 
from innate or developmental pathology. How psychopathology in caregivers can 
influence the dyadic attunement has been illustrated by the impressive vignettes of 
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babies of depressed mothers that show bodily disorganisation and disruptions and 
disengage from contact with the depressed caregiver by not looking at or towards her 
(Papousek & Papousek, 1997).  The impact of developmental disorders on the dyadic 
exchange has been illustrated by studies that investigated interactional responses of 
neurotypical partners during interviews with adolescents with ASD. These studies 
showed appropriate use of gestures, but the feeling of intersubjective exchange in the 
communication partner differed significantly between the groups of typical and ASD 
adolescents (Garcia-Perez, Lee & Hobson, 2007). 
     Both examples show that the dyadic partnering is a flexible process of 
adjustments. Non-verbal attunement is a mutual, interdependent, learning process that 
works in both directions: the child and the caregiver.  
     Explorations into intersubjectivity: a dance informed approach  
The kinaesthetic perspective of the development of early interaction patterns show 
strong similarities with the structure of (adult) interrelating that we find in certain 
dance forms such as dance improvisation, specifically contact improvisation (Paxton, 
2003) can help us to understand the earliest forms of intersubjectivity that have been 
described above. Improvised dance duets are embodied participation in shared 
kinaesthetic patterns. In dance duets mutual understanding and shared creation of 
relationship arise from kinaesthetic partnering (Banes, 1977/79). Regulation of the 
duet is achieved  by  adjusting  one’s  own  impulses  and  adapting  these  to  the  dynamics  
of the interaction. During kinaesthetic partnering dancers are engaged in highly 
attuned mutual responsiveness.   
      “…At several moments, both the dancers and the audience appear to be 
 “taken  by  surprise”  as  one  movement  leads  unexpected  into  another  positioning  
 and/or movement. I see the dancers awakening, coming together, struggling 
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 over different personal and collective obstacles, experiencing moments of calm, 
 moments of great elation, moving toward places where they are in tight 
 synchronicity. At other times, they appear to be feeling each other out for 
 possible new ways to be joined together for their individual and collective 
 benefit…”  (Gibbs, 2003, p.185) 
     In this process shared kinetic qualities present an ’in-between’  experience.  In  the  
‘in-betweenness’  the  dancers  experience  each  other  through  the  shared  movement  
qualities. Participating in each other’s movement patterns both dancers feel, through 
direct perception, the kinetic qualities of their own movement patterns and those of 
their partner (Fuchs & Gambling, 2009). Although cultural components might add a 
specific connotation to the perception of movement (Caldwell, 2010) a non-
conceptual perspective would understand the empathetic relatedness that rises from 
the interaction between the two movers according to the kinaesthetic and 
proprioceptive sensations coming  from  the  dancer’s  own  body  as  well  as from the 
partner’s  body (Pallant, 2006). While attuning to a partner and feeling the other 
person's movements it is possible for a dancer to feel at the same time his own 
movements through proprioception (Gibbs, 2003).  While  dancing  “a  tactile-
kinaesthetic body”  is  “dynamically  attuned”  to  the  world  (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, p. 
261).  
     It is enlivened by the directly perceived immediacy of shared movement qualities 
between dancers (Rouhiainen, 2003; Tufnell & Crickmay, 1990/93). From the shared 
kinetic qualities a sense of intersubjectivity develops that is not informed by 
conceptual or representational systems. Propriocetion of kinetic elements within the 
moving body are  “embedded”  in  the perception of self and thus contribute to an 
embodied experiential self.  
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Kinaesthetic engagement in non-conceptual shared space, time and weight allows 
direct movement reactions.  A similar, primary kinaesthetic responsiveness has been 
described as tensional dialogue, ‘dialogue  tonique’  by De Ajuriaguerra and 
Angelergues (1962 p. 21, as quoted by Corraze, 1997) in their psychomotor view on 
the early interaction pattern between child and caregiver.  
     A dancer can experience intentionality and agency by differentiating from the 
shared movement quality into personal/individual movement patterns. The sense of 
agency during kinaesthetic partnering is directly perceived and transmitted by a “felt  
sense” as described by Gendlin (1962/1997, p. 67). Kinaesthetic attitude and neuronal 
processes enable dancers to empathetically attune to their dance partner during duet 
improvisation. Findings from neuroscience suggest that mirror neurons play a 
significant role in these processes (Rizzolatti, Fabbri-Desto, & Cattaneo, 2009; 
Berrol, 2006; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006).  
     The Social Brain: modulation by experience 
The brain is a developing organ (Schore, 1998). The brain organisation is shaped by 
experiences and vice versa, the structure of our brain organisation modulates 
experiences (Schore, 2003; van der Kolk, 2003). Plasticity and connectivity of neural 
circuits are the result of close interaction of biological maturation of matter and 
experiential shaping of matter (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006). 
     As experiencing is bound to the embodied self (Rochat, 2002), the social templates 
of brain/neuronal structure are the result of embodied relational experiences (Jonsen, 
Churchland, Damasio, Moreno, Schaffner, & Mobley 2002). We might therefore 
expect that the neuronal wiring of the brain will develop new pathways for action 
recognition and social relatedness by embodied experiences that combine perceptive 
and proprioceptive sensory input. Therefore in cases of disturbed early 
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intersubjectivity, compensational intervention might support relational engagement 
and provide intersubjective experience (for a similar concept see “Nachsozialisation”  
proposed by Petzold, 1988, p.236). 
     Dance duet improvisations address the specific functionality captured by the Mirror 
Neuron System (MNS) and shared neuronal circuits. The interplay of sensori-motor 
components during kinaesthetic partnering is characterised by the sensory simultaneity 
of feeling my body move whilst seeing my movement, or hearing the sounds of my 
movement. In the simultaneous processing of sensations coming from within the body 
and impulses coming from outside the body is the (putative) mirror neuron system, 
which has been suggested to play an important role (Gallese, 2003; Bråten, 2007). 
Observed action is matched to self-performed action. Keysers and Perret (2004) 
suggested that the neuronal networks are shaped by simultaneous co-operating groups 
of neurons; through Hebbian learning cells that fire simultaneously will build shared 
neuronal circuits. 
     In a study with expert dancers Calvo-Merino et al (2005) showed that the 
observation of expressive movements led to MNS activity. The dancers showed 
stronger brain activation when watching a movement style in which they were trained 
and thus it was within their personal movement repertoire (2005). During the 
observation of dancers, proprioception is activated more whilst watching familiar 
movements. Personal movement experience contributes to plasticity in the involved 
neuronal circuits (Calvo-Merino et al, 2006). This might lead towards the hypothesis 
that MNS could be looked upon as an inherited potential of the human brain that can 
develop throughout life by experience. 
      It should be taken into account then that social emotional development is not only 
defined in terms of behaviour but also in terms of a maturing and developing social 
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brain (Sommerville & Decety, 2006). Indeed, brain imaging techniques have shown 
that adolescence is a sensitive phase for the social brain, as in this phase brain matter 
and organisation go through a major shift (Blakemore, Ouden, Choudhury, & Frith 
2007; Crone, 2009).  
     The proprioceptive and perceptive traces of kinaesthetic partnering contribute to 
body memory (Morrissey, 2008), which is not a static entity, but is characterized by 
kinetic properties, which define a dynamic process. During kinaesthetic partnering the 
perceptive  traces  are  not  limited  to  the  subject’s  body  and  movements,  but  they  also  
include memories of the moving dyad. Thus a kinaesthetic memory, or to use Stern’s 
words,  “representation of interaction that  has  been  generalised”  (Stern 1985, p. 112), 
a “being  with”  (ibd., p. 111) and  a “feeling  felt”  (Siegel  1996, p. 149), is generated to 
the  subject’s  implicit, embodied patterns of being with others.  
     Kinaesthetic intersubjectivity in dance movement psychotherapy  
Dance movement psychotherapy (DMP) actively addresses the body-informed 
intersubjectivity we have described above. The therapeutic relationship is achieved 
through movement and dance (Payne, 1992).  The therapist will route the therapeutic 
relationship into kinetic intersubjectivity by using shared movement as a specific 
intervention (Samaritter, 2010). In the shared movement situation the therapist uses 
her own bodily movement to ‘meet’ (Payne 1992) the movement patterns of the 
patient. In this corporeal relationship the  therapist  initially  connects  with  the  patient’s  
movement patterns, mirroring them with highly attuned movement patterns. In cases 
of pathological self-organisation or self-regulation the patient may not be able to 
initiate engagement in a mutual relationship.  During the one-sided intentionality from 
the therapist towards the patient, the aim is to bring about bodily-based change in 
intention and attention. The patient is offered a visual and acoustic impression of 
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her/his personal movement material through the attuned movement intervention of the 
therapist, whilst at the same time s/he is experiencing her/his own movements through 
the kinaesthetic senses. The therapist  may  support  the  patient’s  kinaesthetic,  direct  
perception of the dance by offering, through her movement, changes in the kinetic 
qualities such as a shift of rhythm or movement direction, change of spatial position 
or use of weight (Samaritter, 2009). Participating in the kinaesthetic partnering the 
patient is capable of affecting and regulating the shared kinetic qualities through the 
movement s/he contributes to the duet. This activity is similar to the awareness that 
dancers use to address and attune their movements towards a partner in dance 
improvisation as an art form in duets and group performances (Tufnell & Crickmay, 
2004; Fuchs & Gambling, 2009). Through his/her movement actions the patient, as a 
duet partner, comes to experience her/himself as an intentional subject that is met by 
the responsive attitude of the therapist. From shared movement qualities the movers 
develop towards a relational mode that is still characterised by intentional attunement 
to each other, and through interplay or counterbalancing of movement patterns a 
quality of dialogue is achieved.  During the non-verbal relating through kinetic 
qualities during the therapeutic dyadic relation the patient-therapist duet connects to 
preverbal structures of interaction that we have described before as kinaesthetic 
intersubjectivity (Samaritter, 2010). For the therapy situation accounts the same as for 
the dancing dyad, the experience of mutual responsiveness through kinetic structures 
contributes to embodied memory traces (Fuchs, 2000; Morrissey, 2007; Brandstetter, 
2007). According to a Hebbian perspective we would expect that these experiences 
also shape then the neuronal structures involved (Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010; 
Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). 
     Dance  movement  psychotherapists  use  movement  analysis  to  capture  the  patient’s 
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movement patterns in movement profiles. Dance movement diagnostic instruments are 
typically based on Laban Movement Analysis (Laban, 1980; Bartenieff & Lewis, 1980). 
Movement profiling allows a notatation of bodily and spatial organisation as well as 
combined kinetic qualities from the aspects space, time, weight and movement flow (for an 
overview on Laban based movement diagnostic instruments see Koch & Bender, 2007). 
The Kestenberg Movement Analysis (Kestenberg-Amighi et al 1999) allows the profiling of 
the  patient’s  movement  in  relation  to  the  therapist,  group-members or partner as expressed in 
shape-flow patterns and tension-flow rhythms. The movement profiling is processed through 
the incorporated empathetic movement resonance of the observer, who notates the 
movement characteristics through drawing movement traces.  
Movement profiling prior, during and post therapy allows changes in movement behaviour 
over time to be monitored.  
     Kinaesthetic intersubjectivity: the special case of autism 
Atypical social engagement in autism has shown to have an impact on these person-
to-person relations from early developmental stage (Rogers & Williams, 2006). It has 
been observed that children with ASD show:  
- diminished interpersonal exchange (like eye-contact, imitation of simple body 
movements, as well as symbolic imitation) 
- diminished attention to environment (synchronising, pointing, joint attention,). 
 
Of all the dimensions in the appearance of autistic traits the lack of social orientation and 
relating is probably the most significant. It is a core marker through all the diverse 
phenotypes (Kanner, 1943; APA, 2000; WHO, 1992). For a long time theoretical models 
tried to explain impaired social development in ASD through orienting on the deficits in the 
development of social cognition. A strong accent had been given to theories that focus on 
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the development of mental procedures that allow the child to ascribe mental processes to 
others and learn to predict other  peoples’  behaviour. Mental representations of others, as in 
ToM, that enable the acting subject to take into account other subject’s  interests,  states,  
thoughts, feelings, has been shown to be weak in autistic individuals during behavioural and 
mentalizing tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Gallagher, Happé, Brunswick, 
Fletcher, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Baron-Cohen 2003).  
     Other mainstream theories on the development of social cognition hold that in ASD the 
lack of mental representation stems from atypical resonance or mental simulation. The ASD 
child comes (in)to the world with innate atypical resonance to the attuning environment. The 
atypical attunement patterns that occur then in the dyadic dialogue do not allow mental 
simulation to emerge (Gallese, 2007; Williams, 2008). Also due to the atypical development 
of intersubjectivity a lack  of  (relational)  experience  and  from  that  atypical  “ways  of  being  
with”  (Stern,  1985,  p.  xv) will emerge. Indeed a few research studies have shown that the 
interactive behaviour of caregivers of children with ASD alters with a tendency towards 
flattening.  In studies on home-videos early atypical attuning patterns between children with 
ASD and their caregivers have been found (Wimpory, Hobson, & Nash, 2000). 
     After clinical observations had shown that children with ASD less frequently imitate 
interaction partners than typically developing children, Rogers and Pennington (1991) put 
forward the theory that autism might be rooted in impaired early imitation. This could result 
then in further social-communicative impairments in later developmental phases, and thus 
affect the ability to mirror and share emotions and to empathetically engage with another 
subject. Rogers and colleagues (1996; 2006) have shown that children with ASD performed 
as well as typically developing children in tasks with complex goal-directed actions, but 
were significantly different in their imitation of the style in which the actions were 
performed. Also spontaneous imitation was significantly less present in children with ASD 
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than typically developing children (Hobson & Hobson 2008). 
     Self-regulation by the child with ASD consequently is not achieved by directing 
movements towards another person in the environment, but by directing movements towards 
itself. Thus the child is creating a circular perception of its own body. Most vividly this is to 
be observed in the repetitive movements in nearby space, like rocking, spinning, flapping, 
flicking and fast hand movements close to the eyes etc. Rochat (1998) had shown that early 
body organisation and body image arise in typical developing children from the repetitive 
self-observation. The repetitive stimulation of kinaesthetic senses and visual self-perception 
in ASD might be understood as an attempt to establish a notion/feeling of the boundaries of 
the body and to generate a feeling of sameness. 
     This bodily anchored sense of self would then not be an interpersonal one as in typical 
development (Stern, 1985) but a solipsistic one. Hobson (1990) suggested that the 
development of an interpersonal self might be impaired in autism. He points out that 
children with ASD do not develop a concept of self matching the separated other, as they 
“fail  to  be  aware  of  themselves  in  the  minds  of  others”  and  “fail  to  understand  the  nature  of 
other  persons  who  have  their  own  psychological  orientation  toward  the  world”  (ibid.,  p.  
174).  
     In the research studies on spontaneous gestures of social engagement autistic children 
and adolescents were offering less spontaneous verbal and non-verbal gestures of greeting 
and farewell. Autistic subjects responded less often with eye contact when offered a greeting 
and fewer children smiled when waved good-bye (Hobson & Lee, 1998).  Studies on 
gestural interpersonal engagement during interviews with adolescents with ASD showed 
appropriate use of gestures, but the feeling of intersubjective exchange in the 
communication partner differed significantly between the groups of typical and ASD 
adolescents (Garcia-Perez, Lee & Hobson, 2007). In earlier studies, Dawson and Galpert 
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(1990) showed that social orienting behaviour in children with ASD increased after their 
mothers had imitated them during play situations.  
     Field, Sanders and Nadel (2001) showed that imitation by an adult changed non-verbal 
engaging behaviour in children with ASD. Of six rated items of non-verbal engaging 
behaviour (looking at person, positive facial expressions, negative facial expressions, 
positive social gestures, close proximity and touching) five items occurred more often after 
imitation of the child by an adult. Escalona et al (2001) found in a similar study that the 
children after imitation spent less time in gross-motor movements and showed increased 
frequency of physical contact behaviour (spatial closeness, touch). These results suggest that 
imitation of  the  child’s  movement  by an adult might offer a useful potential in the early 
intervention of children with ASD to support the development of social engagement. 
     Programmes for early intervention picked up on these studies. Rogers et al (2003) 
showed that early imitative intervention changed the frequency of initiating contact by the 
autistic child. Early intervention programme at the MIND institute gave positive results 
concerning social engaging behaviour of the autistic child (Carpenter, Pennington & Rogers, 
2001).  
     Ingersoll, Lewis and Kroman (2007) showed that teaching imitation and spontaneous use 
of descriptive gestures to young children with ASD increases their imitation of gestures in 
structured settings; also some participants used more spontaneous descriptive gestures. 
These studies focussed on gestural imitation, which is a form of conceptual interaction. 
However valuable they are in the course of early intervention, they do not solve the problem 
of primary relating with the child with ASD. From a kinaesthetic perspective the question 
then arises whether a body and movement oriented intervention using early developmental 
forms of synchronising with the movement patterns of the child could bring about more non-
verbal social and interpersonal orientation in children with ASD. In terms of body 
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organisation the process of direct interaction in autism is hindered by the problems in the 
sensory motor organisation of the autistic child (Baranek, 2002). 
      DMP in Autism Spectrum Disorders 
DMP is known for a wide range of body-oriented and movement interventions (Lewis, 
1979; Stanton-Jones, 1992; Payne, 1992, 2006; Levy, 1992; Meekums, 2002) with diverse 
psycho-social and psychiatric problems. The clinical DMP intervention  “Shared  Movement 
Approach”  (SMA)  has  been  described  as  a  method  for  psychotherapeutic  intervention  in  
disorders with a disturbed sense of self, like in attachment trauma or autism (Samaritter, 
2010). In this developmentally informed type of DMP the therapist actively addresses non-
verbal attunement between movers. The aim of the intervention is to bring about relational 
movement experiences in patients who do not have a clear sense of self and whose self 
perception is not anchored in embodied experiences (Erfer, 1995; Loman, 1995). 
     SMA addresses the mutual engagement at a level from which the child is capable to 
engage.  This  orientation  to  resources  is  facilitated  through  the  therapist’s  bodily sensitivity 
to, and knowledge of, movement analysis.  The  child’s  assessed  movement  profile  outlines  
the movement capacities and strengths and helps to identify the gaps in the movement 
repertoire (Loman & Foley, 2003). Moreover this analysis provides the potential 
possibilities for the interaction partner/therapist to join or meet with the kinetic patterns of 
the patient. The therapist shapes the movement intervention according to this information. 
The therapist arranges the situation for the participants to be invited into movement activity. 
S/he offers sufficient containment for the participant to bear the non-verbal contact and 
organizes  the  situation  in  a  way  that  stimulates  the  child’s  intrinsic  developmental  impulse.   
Attention  is  directed  towards  the  patient’s  kinaesthetic  perception.  In  the  therapeutic  
situation non-verbal synchronisation and inter-corporeal relating are major techniques used 
by the therapist for establishing and maintaining contact and relationship. The therapist is 
 21 
mirroring, matching and challenging  the  child’s  movement  through  kinetic  qualities  like  
rhythm, weight and direction. The spontaneous movement reaction of the child to the 
situation offers the potential to reconnect with an autonomous developmental process 
(Samaritter, 1990). Through this non-verbal relating in kinetic qualities the therapist and 
client connect in pre-verbal structures of interaction that have been described as embodied 
intersubjectivity (Samaritter & Payne, 2010). The patient experiences her/himself as an 
animated, acting subject capable of co-regulating the intersubjective relationship. 
Kinaesthetic  experiences  are  wired  through  direct  perception  into  the  patient’s  organisation  
of the perceptual and proprioceptive body. The customary movement patterns thus are 
brought into a new relational context. These bodily-enlivened participatory experiences offer 
new  ‘ways  of  being  with’  and  contribute  to  new  body  memory  on  interpersonal  movement  
repertoire.  
     Movement analysis during dyadic activity with patients with ASD provides the 
opportunity to look at structures of interpersonal responsiveness that precede the semantic 
and conceptual structures. A micro-analysis of what is going on in the dyadic contact would 
be needed to analyse where intentionality of an attuning partner is met or answered by the 
patient. As discussed before, movement analysis instruments allow profiling the non-verbal 
characteristics of the dyadic attunement. Although every child and every dyad has specific 
characteristics of its own, there are strong similarities in movement patterns throughout the 
autistic spectrum. Sossin and Loman (1992) described that a general movement profile of 
ASD would be characterised by a tendency to use neutral shape-flow, which gives the 
impression of lack of (kinaesthetic) animation and involves loss of body boundaries. There 
is also characteristically a strong tendency to move with highly localised tension-flow, 
resulting in lack of movement continuity and in apparently unrelated or clashing patterns 
during movement adjustments. Partial stabilisation seems to be largely undeveloped together 
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with a strong preference for shrinking patterns of shape flow. Shaping in spatial planes, like 
organising posture around a partner, is usually not found in those with ASD (Sossin & 
Loman, 1992). 
     The outcomes of DMP interventions as described in clinical case studies show strong 
resemblance with the effects of imitation on the social engaging behaviour in those with 
ASD as described by Escalona, Field, Nadel & Lundy, (2002). Therapists report that during 
the intervention the child shows more sensori-motor organisation and a reduction of 
fragmented perceptions and movements during movement activities. They also report an 
increase of intentional movements going from the child towards the therapist or caregiver 
(Erfer, 1995; Loman, 1995; Loman & Foley, 2003). Also creative movement therapy has 
shown positive effects on the sensori-motor organisation of the child with ASD (Hartshorn, 
Olds, Filed, Delage, Dullen, & Escalona, 2001). Research studies have shown that imitation 
of the child with ASD by an adult researcher or parents/caregiver has a positive effect on the 
child’s  social  relating  patterns  (Field,  Sanders,  Nadel,  2001).  The imitation used in these 
studies comes close to the mirroring intervention in DMP described before but has not yet 
been researched in the dynamic context of the DMP setting.  
     For the development of the child with ASD these outcomes are important. Interventions 
that improve the ability of the child with ASD to attune with others will help the child to 
take part in social interactions with peers, like during sports, communication and play 
situations. If this attunement is improved, the child will have a greater chance to participate 
autonomously  in  social  interactions  and  thereby  be  more  independent  from  caregiver’s 
intervention. 
     Internationally, research into ASD focuses more and more on possible 
interventions  to  alter  the  impact  of  the  condition  on  a  child’s  development; with a 
strong focus on interventions to support communicative capacities in the child with 
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ASD (Chiang, Soong, Lin & Rogers, 2008; Hobson & Hobson, 2008). DMP might 
offer a compensational intervention for the child with ASD to support relational 
engagement and provide intersubjective experience.  
     Consequently a study on how to support non-verbal attunement in children with 
ASD might be of value. Improved attunement to the non-verbal behaviour of 
communication partners may increase the possibilities for the ASD child to take part 
in social situations and could lead to more autonomy in social interaction. Such a 
study is proposed with the following questions: 
a) Does SMA intervention increase actions of social orienting movements of the 
participants (e.g. eye-contact) – as drawn from movement profiles? 
b) Does SMA intervention have an impact on social behaviour profile as drawn e.g. from 
parental questionnaires? 
c) Does SMA intervention have an impact on the neuronal activation profile as drawn 
from fMRI scans? 
     Conclusion 
In this paper we propose a kinaesthetic perspective to intersubjectivity. A model of 
kinaesthetic partnering has been introduced to describe mutual attunement and 
understanding during early dyadic interaction. Body-informed intersubjectivity 
emerges from attentive,  kinaesthetic  orientation  towards  a  shared  ”in-between”,  that  
can be a gesture, movement quality or shared movement theme. In the co-creation of 
interpersonal relatedness the dancers come to experience themselves as intentional 
subjects through their impact on patterns and movement qualities of the shared 
movement. The moving body, that is, the acting and perceiving body, generates 
experiences of shared kinetic qualities through shared space, rhythm or weight. 
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Differentiation from shared corporeality can lead towards the experience of agency 
and bodily anchored self.  
 
The “Shared  Movement Approach”  has  been  presented  as  a  clinical  application  of  
these concepts in the treatment of children with ASD. Further research is proposed to 
investigate the effectiveness of a DMP intervention focussing on the question of 
whether SMA interventions result in increasing non-verbal interpersonal attunement 
and engagement in children with ASD.  
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